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Ellis: Pleading: Requirements of Pleading Not Altered by Discovery Rules

CASE COMMENTS
PLEADING: REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADING NOT ALTERED
BY DISCOVERY RULES
Romans v. Warm Mineral Springs, Inc.,
155 So. 2d 183 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963)
Appellant brought suit individually and as administrator of decedent's estate, claiming that decedents death was caused by the negligence of appellee. Deceased paid a fee to enter the premises of appellee for the purpose of diving in water that exceeded 100 feet in depth.
While diving he drowned and appellant contended that appellee was
negligent in allowing deceased to dive in water of such depth; in failing to provide a life guard; in failing promptly to aid deceased; and in
failing to provide adequate rescue equipment. A motion to dismiss for
failure to state a cause of action was granted. On appeal, HELD, the
complaint did not state a cause of action because it did not allege that
deceased was engaged in diving at the time of his death and thus set
out no causal connection between the injury suffered and the negligence of appellee.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.8(b), which governs the requirements of the complaint, is contradictory in its terms. On the one hand
it provides that the claim for relief "must state a cause of action . . . "
The same rule also states that the complaint is sufficient if it "informs
the defendant of the nature of the cause against him . . . :
Historically, under the "cause of action" concept the pleader had to
state in his complaint every ultimate fact essential to recovery.1 Such
a system created many problems due largely, as one commentator has
suggested, to the imprecise meaning of the word "fact" and the difficulty encountered in attempting to distinguish between "ultimate"
facts and "evidentiary" facts.2 The term "cause of action" was eliminated when the federal rules were promulgated because of the problems it caused, and the term "claim upon which relief may be granted"
was substituted.3 This substitution was intended to effectuate one of
the primary objectives of the new federal rules, namely, to relieve the
pleadings of the burden of informing the opposing party of the facts of
1. Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195
(1940); Gus' Baths, Inc. v. Lightbawn, 118 Fla. 818, 160 So. 870 (1935); Morrison v. Braddock, 100 Fla. 1152, 131 So. 124 (1930).
2. Sunderland, The New FederalRules, 45 W. VA. L. REv. 5, 12 (1938).
3. FED. B. Civ. P. 8(a) (2).
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the case and to let him obtain these facts through the use of discovery
procedure.4
The Florida rule reflects this changed function of the pleadings by
providing that a complaint will be sufficient if it informs the defendant
of the nature of the plaintiffs case. The Florida courts have also recognized the change. For example, in Cushen v. Cushen5 the Third
District Court of Appeals stated that the rules were designed to simplify pleading and to eliminate the necessity of setting forth all ultimate facts in the complaint.
Before promulgation of the 1950 Rules of Civil Procedure the Florida courts applied the strict common law requirement that every fact
necessary to state a cause of action be stated in the complaint. 6 But
since the new rules have been in effect the Florida Supreme Court has
recognized that a liberal construction of the complaint should be allowed in order to let the complainant have his trial on the merits, although he still must show more than a mere grievance in his cornplaint.7 In one of the first cases to reach the Florida Supreme Court
after the rules were promulgated" the court conspicuously omitted use
of the words "cause of action" and "ultimate facts" in its interpretation
of Rule 1.8(b) and substituted the words "case" and "factual matter"
where appropriate. 9
The court has also recognized that under the new rules the purpose
of the complaint is not to apprise the opposing party of every fact on
which the plaintiff intends to rely but rather it is to inform the opposing party of the nature of the action asserted.10 All relevant facts are
now to be obtained in advance of trial, not from the pleadings, but by
the various discovery methods provided for in the rules." If the complaint informs the defendant of the nature of the plaintiffs case, then a
motion to dismiss for failure to allege sufficient facts should be denied.'2 All that is now required is that the complaint inform the de4. Chillingworth & White, The Pre-Trial Conference in Florida, 4 U. FLA.
L. REv. 141, 144 (1950).

5. 143 So. 2d 586 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
6. Roney v. Miami Beach, 148 Fla. 52, 3 So. 2d 701 (1941).
7. Messana v. Maule Indus., Inc., 50 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1951). This case was

decided under Florida Common Law Rule 9(b), which was virtually identical to

Fla. R. Civ. P. 18(b).
8. Messana v.Maule Indus., Inc., supra note 7.
9. "A liberal construction will be allowed to effectuate the intended purpose
of allowing a complainant to state his case and facilitate an expeditious trial on its
merits ....

He must plead factual matter sufficient to apprise his adversary of

what he is called upon to answer... :' (Emphasis added.) Id. at 876.
10. Connelly v.Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1956).
11. Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So. 2d 341 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
12. Cushen v. Cushen, supra note 5.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol16/iss4/7

2

19641

CASE COMMENTS
Ellis: Pleading: Requirements
of Pleading Not Altered by Discovery Rules

fendant of what the plaintiff is complaining about so that the defendant can make an adequate answer.13
On occasion the Florida courts have expressed views contrary to
those set forth above. In Kislak v. Kreedian'14 the Supreme Court of
Florida considerably restricted the liberality of Rule 1.8(b). In one of
the few opinions that have attempted to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the rule,15 the court said that a complaint must allege all the
ultimate facts on which the plaintiff plans to recover and that a cause
of action must be stated in order to inform adequately the defendant
of the nature of the cause asserted against him.
Under this reasoning a complaint cannot adequately inform the
defendant of the nature of the plaintiff's cause unless it states a cause
of action. This view is not in line with prior cases interpreting the
rule;16 nor have subsequent cases followed it.17 In fact, in the Cushen
case the Third District Court of Appeal seems to have reasoned in a
manner exactly opposite that of the supreme court in the Kislak case.
The court stated that if a complaint informs the defendant of the nature of the cause then it states a cause of action within the meaning of
the rule.' 8
Virtually every complaint filed in a Florida court has been drawn
under Rule 1.8(b), yet the courts have been reluctant to give the rule
a consistent interpretation. The interpretation given to it in the present case may be technically correct inasmuch as 1.8(b) does say that a
"cause of action" must be stated. But such an interpretation is unfortunate because it places the complainant in much the same position he
was in before the new rules were enacted. That is, in his pleadings he
now must inform the opposing party of all the ultimate facts upon
which he intends to rely. If he neglects to do so his case may be dismissed. This is exactly the result that the new rules sought to avoid by
providing that the complaint would be sufficient if it informs the defendant of the nature of the cause asserted and by allowing necessary
facts to be obtained through discovery proceedings.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Saks v. Smith, 145 So. 2d 895 (8d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
95 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1957).
Id. at 514.
Messana v. Maule Indus., Inc., 50 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1951); Connelly v.

Sebeco, Inc., 89 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1956).

17. Bowen v. Manuel, 144 So. 2d 341 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962); Cushen v.
Cushen, 143 So. 2d 536 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
18. "The test is whether the complaint (petition here) is sufficient to state a
cause of action. The petition informed the respondent of the nature of the cause
of action and . . . we'affirm." Cushen v. Cushen, 143 So. 2d 536 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1962). But cf. Van Heusden v. Grover, 115 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1959).
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